Thucydides Trap

The Thucydides Trap is a concept rooted in ancient Greek history. Thucydides, a Greek historian, documented the Peloponnesian War, a protracted conflict between Athens (the rising power) and Sparta (the established power) in the 5th century BCE. Thucydides famously wrote: “The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon [Sparta] made war inevitable” (Thucydides 1950).

Graham Allison, at Harvard, labelled the phenomenon described by Thucydides as Thucydides’ Trap. He described it as “[…] the severe structural stress caused when a rising power threatens to upend a ruling one” (Allison 2017).

Thucydides' writings provide insights into the dynamics that led to conflict between Athens and Sparta. Athens' rapid rise in power and influence, coupled with Sparta's fear of losing its dominant position, ultimately resulted in the destructive war between the two city-states. Thucydides pointed to some key elements. The first was a powershift as Athens' growth in military and economic power was perceived as a direct challenge to Sparta's traditional hegemony in Greece. The second encompassed fear and misperception: Sparta's fear of Athenian power was a critical factor driving both sides towards war. Misperceptions, often rooted in fear, exacerbated tensions. Third, the inevitability of conflict: Thucydides' assertion that the war was "inevitable" underscores the belief that such power transitions tend to lead to conflict.

In our times, the Thucydides Trap has been used to analyse the rise of China and what this means to the US and the globe. In his book, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?, Allison writes: “Thucydides’s Trap refers to the natural, inevitable discombobulation that occurs when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power. This can happen in any sphere. But its implications are most dangerous in international affairs. For just as the original instance of Thycydides’ Trap resulted in a war that brought ancient Greece to its knees, this phenomenon has haunted diplomacy in the millennia since. Today it has set the world’s two biggest powers on a path to a cataclysm nobody wants, but which they may prove unable to avoid” (Allison 2017).

Allison’s work has been embraced and/or adopted by policy makers, especially in the US—both Democrats and Republicans—, and thus part of the US foreign policy direction is taken from Allison’s work, and so the approach seems to be from the Realist perspective and of a pessimistic nature. He writes, “Based on the current trajectory, war between the United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than recognized at the moment. Indeed, judging by the historical record, war is more likely than not. Moreover, current underestimations and misapprehensions of the hazards inherent in the U.S.-China relation-ship contribute greatly to those hazards. A risk associated with Thucydides’s Trap is that business as usual—not just an unexpected, extraordinary event—can trigger large-scale conflict” (Allison 2015).