Neoclassical Realism

Neoclassical realism reconnects with valuable insights from classical realism, combined with the acceptance of key structural realist propositions. As such, neoclassical realism seeks a middle ground between approaches that try to explain international political phenomena from within states’ domestic politics, and approaches that look for explanations at the international level (Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016). Despite their appreciation of a host of domestic explanatory factors, neoclassical realists agree that the international structure, and any state’s position in that structure based on its power capabilities, pose important constraints to states’ foreign policy choices. But which specific choices they make among a range of possibilities, cannot be explained by structural factors alone.

The term ‘neoclassical realism’ was coined by Gideon Rose in a 1998 review of books that according to him offered a different kind of realism than the dominant neorealism. For him, this new theorizing “explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought. Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical” (Rose, 1998).

In their 2016 state-of-the-art book, Ripsman et al. take structural realism as a point of departure; systemic stimuli are the main independent variables, which cause important international phenomena. What they refer to as Type I neoclassical realism, stays very close to structural realism, by just modifying the latter to explain anomalies. This strand proposes two ‘structural modifiers.’

The first is clarity of the signals and information presented to states. When signals are unclear, states have difficulties to predict the near future (e.g. when Hitler becomes dictator in 1933 and renounces the limits on German rearmament). The threat becomes much clearer in 1938 when Hitler takes Czechoslovakia in its entirety after having just taken Sudetenland, and starts to claim parts of Poland; only then Britain drops its appeasement policy – confirming structural realist predictions.

The second is about a permissive versus restrictive environment. In a permissive environment, there is no acute threat, and states have more room for maneuver and more options. Neoclassical realists would consider the current relationship between the US and China as permissive. In contrast, a restrictive environment drastically narrows the window for policy options; here we can again refer to the threats Hitler posed to Europe in 1938-1939, leaving the other powers no other choice than to ready for war in the very near future.

According to Ripsman et al., Type II neoclassical realism appreciates a set of intervening variables, between the systemic stimuli and actual policy responses (i.e. foreign policy), contributing to a much more sophisticated theoretical framework – which is the most representative for neoclassical realism. Systemic stimuli are filtered by perceptions and a decision-making process. The same facts can be perceived or interpreted in various ways. These interpretations, in their turn, are influenced by the personality and world view of the leader and foreign policy elites (leader images), and by the long-standing strategic culture of the country. Strategic culture refers to the guiding principles and broad orientations of a country’s foreign policy. It possesses a certain stability and only changes as a result of extraordinary developments such as a radical shift of government, dramatic changes in the international system, or deeper sociological transformations.

Decision-making, then, is influenced by elites’ perceptions of a situation, strategic culture, state-society relations and domestic institutions. State-society relations refer to the relationship between the states’ government and foreign policy establishment and societal actors such as the military, business elites, civil society, media, etc. In some states the armed forces enjoy some political autonomy and power, which enables them to have a strong influence over the government. In addition, the way constitutional and real power is distributed among domestic institutions, matters a lot for key foreign policy decisions, including resort to war.

In this theoretical framework, the dependent variables are the foreign policy decisions or policy responses. Here, authors distinguish between short-term foreign policy decisions (often to do with crisis management), mid-term foreign policy, and long-term foreign policy (which amounts to the articulation of a ‘grand strategy’).

Type III makes the neoclassical projects complete. Here, foreign policy – shaped by the independent and intervening variables – feeds into the international system, with the potential to change it. Think of the way Soviet leader Michael Gorbachev at the end of the 1980s responded to the dangers for nuclear war and pressures on the domestic economy stemming from the very tense bipolar confrontation in the period 1979-1985 and arms race (i.e. systemic stimuli), based on his personality, world view, and his struggles within domestic society and institutions (i.e. intervening variables), by taking unilateral steps aimed at arms control and international détente (i.e. foreign policy decisions) and domestic reform, which led to the end of the Cold War and, in 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union itself and the end of bipolarity (i.e. transformation of the international system).